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COMMUNITY LEGAL CLINICS IN
ONTARIO
Mary Jane Mossman*

Ontario has a system offully funded yet independent network
of community law clinics like those advocated in Rees' paper.
Professor Mossman explores the forces that led to the
establishment of the community clinics, their relationships to the
judicare system and the purposes behind the government's
assumption of responsibility for funding and defunding clinics:
service to low income people, community involvement and
representation and independence from funding sources. While
Rees seems to suggest that government funded community clinics
would automatically further these purposes, Mossman argues
that scope of service, community involvement and funding
decision processes must be structured very carefully in order to
enhance clinics' abilities to engage in meaningful representation,
and warns that the early community clinic movement could be
easily subverted by concentrating decision making control over
clinics in the hands of the government, the law society, the clinic
or even of other community groups.

Les Centres judiciaires communautaires
en Ontario
L 'Ontario possede un systeme de centres judiciaires
communautaires, completement finances mais inddpendants,
comme ceux preconisds dans l'essai de M. Rees. Le professeur
Mossman explore les forces qui ont men6 d l'tablissement des
centres communautaires, leur rapport avec le systeme d'aide
judiciaire, et les buts sous-jacents d la decision gouvernementale
de se charger de la responsabilite de financer (ou de cesser de
financer) ces centres: service aux pauvres, participation et
representation de la communaute, independance j I'egard des
sources definancement. Tandis que M. Rees semble suggerer que
des centres communautaires finances par le gouvernement
avanceraient forciment ces buts, M. Mossman pretend que
l'tendue des services, la participation de la communautj et les
proc~ds de decision quant au financement doivent etre
structures avec grand soin pour augmenter les capacitds des
centres d'offrir une representation efficace. Il avertit qu'e6 ses
debuts le mouvement de centres communautaires pourrait
facilement atre perverti si le contr~le de leurs decisions 6tait
concentre entre les mains du gouvernement, de l'association des
avocats, du personnel du centre ou mme d'autres groupements
communautaires.
*Associate Professor Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University

(1983), 3 Windsor Yearbook ofAccess to Justice
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Introduction
"I would like to add significantly to the resources available to clinics
.. .the clinics are in a position to take the law to those who need it
most. It is almost trite to point out that a great many poor people have
never been made aware of the right they enjoy under our laws. . . The
clinics, located in, and run by, local communities, can reach out to
advise people of their rights. They take the law to the people . . . In
doing all of this, the clinics help convince the poor that they have a
stake in this society."'

This 1982 statement by Ontario's Attorney-General is one of
the positive statements that has been made about legal aid in
Canada recently. While it is by no means Mr. McMurtry's first
statement of support for the work of community clinics in
Ontario, it is of special significance for two reasons. In the first
place, it is a public statement of support for clinics in Ontario
at a time when general policies of governmental restraint across
Canada have resulted in significant, even fatal, cutbacks in
legal aid programs.' Secondly, the statement demonstrates
support for increased resources for Ontario clinics at the very
time when the Minister was deciding to offer only modest tariff
increases to Ontario lawyers providing legal aid services under
the complementary judicare program. 3 The possibility that
resources for community clinics would actually be increasedin
the face of governmental restraint, and the inevitable pressure
to restrict expenditures, thus suggests a very high level of
support by the Attorney-General for community clinics.
The value of the Minister's personal support for community
clinics is substantial; indeed, on some occasions in the past, his
personal support appears to have been critical to their survival."
Clearly, the fact that the Ministry of the Attorney-General
provides substantial funding for legal aid in Ontario, as well as
his role under the Regulation in "designating" the funds for
clinics out of the overall legal aid budget, 5 place the Minister in
The Honourable R. Roy McMurtry, Q.C., Attorney-General for Ontario,
"Notes for a Statement to the Ontario Legislature Standing Committee on
the Administration of Justice", December 1, 1982, 30-31.
2 For example, Nova Scotia's legal aid budget was reduced by 25 % for
1982-83; British Columbia was required to cut back by $1.3 million from a
budget of $17.3 million and decided to institute a user fee and reduce the
services provided; in Saskatchewan, certificates to the private bar were
withheld for three months in 1982 to save costs; in Manitoba, by contrast,
three was a small increase in the 1982-83 budget, but this followed several
years of restraint. Survey Information, National Legal Aid Research
Centre, Ottawa, November 1982; B.C. Legal Services Society Newsletter,
October 1982.
3 In response to the Law Society's requested tariff increase of 30%, the
Minister announced on January 15, 1983 a 5% increase retroactive to July
1982, with a further 5% increase effective July 1983, There had been no
increase since 1979. Globe andMail, January 15, 1982.
4 S.R. Ellis, Q.C., "A View of the Profession of Law" (1982) Bar Admission

CourseMaterials, 19.
5 R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 578, s. 159.
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an enviable position to nurture community clinics in
accordance with his personal support for them. That the
Minister's support is desirable seems self-evident; the real issue
is whether it is, by itself, the explanation for the survival of
Ontario clinics in the face of widespread restraint and cutbacks.
It has become clear in the early 1980's that many legal aid
programs, established with idealism and great expectations in
the 1960's and 1970's, have been all too easily eroded or
destroyed as governmental restraint has become necessary in
the face of an economic recession. For all practical purposes,
legal aid has been regarded as just one more government
program that is too expensive; there has been little or no
recognition that legal services for the poor are any different
from other social welfare programs. In this context, it is
tempting to conclude that the reason that Ontario community
clinics survive, even thrive, is the Minister's personal support
for them. Such a conclusion, however, denies that the clinic
movement has any inherent validity, for it assumes that their
continued survival depends solely on his continued goodwill.
More importantly, such a conclusion threatens the integrity of
independent legal services; to say that legal services can be
provided to the poor in Ontario only because, and so long as,
the Minister supports the effort to do so by clinics, is to deny to
clinics any capacity for independent legal representation of the
poor. Even more significantly, it may also deny clinics capacity
for any representation of the poor against, most frequently, the
government whom the Attorney-General represents in law
enforcement matters. The real issue is, therefore, whether
Ontario clinics would have the capacity to provide independent
legal services to the poor in the absence of Mr. McMurtry's
personal support.
This paper is an exploration of the special nature of
community clinics in Ontario. It asserts that Ontario clinics are
unique in terms of their history, their structure, and their focus,
and that no other system of clinics has such an inherent
capacity to thrive independently of the Minister's personal
support. Because of these special attributes, it also follows that
no other clinic system has a greater opportunity to use its
resources effectively to achieve the goal of equal justice for the
poor. The challenge for Ontario clinics is to use their unique
creatively and effectively toward achieving equal
opportunity
6
justice.
II. In the Beginning: A Brief History
The history of community clinics in Ontario is not neat; like
the clinic system itself, it is an amalgam of special
6

The phrase "equal justice" is taken from Cappelletti, Gordley and
Johnson, Jr., Toward Equal Justice: A ComparativeStudy of Legal Aid in
Modern Societies (Dobbs Ferry: 1975).
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communities. The history is also organic and still evolving, and
underlies both the structure which has developed and the focus
of clinic work. The history of the clinics is also part of the
overall history of legal aid in Ontario; an understanding of
clinics within the overall legal aid system in Ontario is
fundamental to appreciating their significance, both past and

present.
"Modern" legal aid programs in Canada developed only
recently. The first such program was established in Ontario by

the Legal Aid Act in 1966.1 Based on a report (the Joint
Committee Report') recommending the establishment of a
publicly-funded legal aid program to replace the services
previously provided by lawyers on a charitable basis, the new
legal aid plan demonstrated that: ". . . legal aid should form
part of the administration of justice in its broadest sense. It is
no longer a charity but a right." 9 Recognition of this principle
resulted in the implementation of legal aid programs in most of
the Canadian provinces over the next few years. 0I
The establishment of publicly-funded legal aid programs in
Canada was a very significant development, and their impact
on courts, lawyers, and clients cannot be over-estimated. 1
' S.O. 1966, c. 80.
'Report of the Joint Committee on Legal Aid, William B. Common, Q.C.
Chairman (March 1965). Mr. Common was then Deputy Attorney-General
for the Province of Ontario, and the Committee was composed of members
of the Law Society of Upper Canada, appointed by the Treasurer, and
members of the civil service of Ontario, appointed by the Attorney-General.
See JointCommittee Report, 5.

9Id., 97.
10Newfoundland

The LegalAid Act (1976)

Nova Scotia

Legal Aid PlanningAct (1970)

New Brunswick
Quebec
Manitoba

Legal A idA ct (1972)
Loi de I'aidejuridique(1972)
Legal Aid Services Society of Manitoba Act
(1972)
Act to A mend the LegalProfessionAct (1967)

The LegalAct (1977)

Saskatchewan

The Community Legal Services (Saskatchewan)
British Columbia

Yukon
N.W.T.

Act (1974)
Court Rules of PracticeAct (1968)
The Legal Services Commission Act (1975)

The Legal Services Society Act (1979)
LegalAid Ordinance(1975)
Legal Services Ordinance(1979)

An Act passed for Prince Edward Island has not been proclaimed; in
Alberta, the Legal Aid Society has been incorporated under the Societies
Act and the plan functions as an agreement between the province and the
Law Society. See Statistics Canada, Legal Aid, 1981 (Minister of Supply
and Services Canada: 1981), 10-12.
''See, for example, Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on
Administration of Ontario Courts (Ministry of the Attorney-General:
1973), II1, 126-127. See also chapter 7 generally.
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More importantly, in a society committed to equality, the need
for legal aid services is unquestioned.' 2 In the context of the
Ontario Legal Aid Plan, the objective of equality in the
administration of justice was clearly stated; it was intended that
the same legal aid services be made available to the poor as were
already being provided to fee-paying clients.' 3 With the benefit
of hindsight, it is easy to appreciate that such a concept of
"equal justice" was too narrow, and that the legal services
which poor people most needed were those that responded to
their problems, not to the problems of fee-paying clients.
Gradually, it was recognized that the poor had legal problems
quite different from those of the non-poor, and that Ontario's
legal aid system, based on the norm of the fee-paying client,
often did not provide appropriate assistance. 4 In addition, the
Plan's services were criticized because they were provided by
the same private practice lawyers who worked on behalf of feepaying clients. Of course, the use of the same lawyers to
provide services to rich and poor alike arguably represented the
epitome of equal opportunity - if but only if both groups of
clients required the same services. As it became clear that
lawyers acting for the poor needed to be familiar with poverty
law, it also became clear that specialization was desirable and
that salaried lawyers were needed because they could devote
their energies solely to the legal needs of the poor.
At the same time that such issues were being discussed about
the scope of the Plan's legal aid services and the appropriate
means of providing them, concerns were also expressed about
the legal profession's continued monopoly on decision making
in the context of a publicly-funded program. While it might
have been appropriate for the Law Society of Upper Canada to
administer the earlier charitable legal aid program, it was
suggested that the public who paid for the program, and the
poor to whom it was directed, deserved some opportunity for
input in decisions about legal aid services.II These concerns

12

In the first Annual Report of the OLAP, this principle was recognized; the
Report stated: "There has always existed, even within the most enlightened

society, a disparity between the availability of a lawyer to the well-to-do
and to the indigent .... Ontario has now taken a giant stride to ensure that
no one shall be denied the services or advice of a lawyer because of lack of
money .. " Ontario Legal Aid Plan, The Law Society of Upper Canada,
Annual Report 1968, 6.
13

Id.

for example, Taman, The Legal Services Controversy: An
Examinationof the Evidence (National Council of Welfare: 1971).
15 Significantly, the Joint Committee noted in 1965: "The almost unanimous
view expressed to the Committee was that the administration should be the
exclusive responsibility of the Law Society of Upper Canada. This
partnership between the Provincial Government and the Law Society has
existed for 14 years and there is no reason in the opinion of the Committee,
for any change." See Joint Committee Report, 99.
4See,
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must be understood in the context of scepticism whether
lawyers could be trusted to act effectively in the public interest,
and increasing concern about their monopoly on legal services.
In several provinces which established legal aid programs after
1966, such arguments bolstered the desire for an independent
corporation with a Board composed of some non-lawyer
members. ' 6 In Ontario, by contrast, the Legal Aid Act granted
responsibility for the administration of legal aid to the Law
Society of Upper Canada, the governing body of the Ontario
legal profession. ,7
The alleged deficiencies of the Ontario Plan were frequently
debated in the late 1960's and early 1970's against the backdrop
of the American legal services programs and President
Johnson's War on Poverty, as well as the Canadian concept of
"the just society". In a general way, the ideas about equality of
of opportunity were fuelled by a growing mistrust of
professionals and their monopoly on information and skills to
generate a desire for increased community or public
participation in decision making and collective action.
Notwithstanding that the Ontario Legal Aid Plan had signified
a major societal change in attitude as recently as 1966, the
currency of such ideas inevitably led to dissatisfaction with
both the goals and the methods of the Plan.
Essentially, it was the critics of the Plan who initiated and
established alternative legal aid services in response to "unmet
needs"; and it is these services which formed the nucleus of the
community clinic system now in place. For example, the need to
provide assistance for specialized poverty law problems
motivated (at least partly) the organization of Injured Workers'
Consultants, a program in which injured workers themselves
assisted others with compensation claims. The scarcity of
lawyers who were familiar with compensation claims as well as
the group's desire to engage in self-help, contributed to the
creation of a "clinic" with no lawyer involvement at all, a
model decidedly different from the Plan's legal aid services.II
Similarly, the need for help in a developing legal field
contributed to the establishment of the Canadian
Environmental Law Association; the "clinic" undertook
litigation "in the public interest" and acted for client groups,
activities which were not then recognized by the Plan as being
needed legal services. 1 9 At the same time, Parkdale Community
'6 For example, Saslatchewan, Manitoba and Quebec. See especially Larsen,
"Seven Years with Legal Aid (1972-79) A Personal View of Some Events
and Background Literature" (1981), 11 Man. L.J. 237.
17Act, s. 2. The Law Society's power is "subject to the approval of the
Attorney-General".
The early group apparently was funded by a Local Initiatives Program
grant.
'9 The original group also included a major research focus, the Canadian
Environmental Law Research Foundation (CELA).
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Legal Services was established, using law students to provide
legal services to the poor.20 Early on, Parkdale decided to
confine its services to a defined geographical community and to
limit its services to matters for which the Plan would not
provide a certificate; a little later, Parkdale also began to set up
structures for community input in decisions about the services
it offered, thereby demonstrating a need for services other than
those offered by the Plan.
All of these early clinics were established in response to "unmet legal needs", and to fill the "gaps" in the services available from the Plan. As is evident from the brief description
above, however, early clinics were designed to meet a number
of different objectives, using a variety of means. They did not
follow any coherent plan or overall set of priorities for
alternative legal services. Yet the ideas originally generated by
the establishment of these and similar clinics have evolved as
the articulated principles of existing community clinics in
Ontario. In particular, the experiences of the early clinics
identified two principles. One principle is the need to focus
clinic services on the legal needs of the poor; in particular, the
need to respond to the real needs of poor people, utilizing
specialized personnel that includes both lawyers and
community workers. The second principle is the need for
community involvement in decision making, especially the need
to involve the poor community and legal aid clinic clients in
decisions about their legal aid services.
The early clinics must also receive credit for the development
of a third principle, that of clinic independence. As is apparent,
all of the early legal aid clinics were established as alternatives
to the government-funded legal aid Plan. On this basis, of
course, they could be described as independent of the Plan in
every respect. It is unclear to what extent they were also
independent of their initial funding sources: the federal
Department of Justice, LIP (Local Initiatives Program) grants,
university funding and private foundation grants. Parkdale was
2
even funded initially by the American Ford Foundation . 1
However, while it may be that the early clinics were not
independent of their initial funding sources, it is nonetheless
clear that they operated independently of the Plan in their
formative years. The Plan did not direct their activities and
accepted no responsibility for them financially. Thus, the third
principle which emerges from an assessment of the early
experience of Ontario clinics is the independence of clinics from
the Ontario Legal Aid Plan. The clinics received no direction
20 Parkdale opened in September 1971; it seems that both Injured Workers'

Consultants (IWC) and CELA commenced at approximately the same
time, or a little earlier. Further research on the early beginning of clinics is
needed to be any more specific.
2 The Ford Foundation supported clinical legal education programs through
Legal Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR.).
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nor any financial support from the Plan. They were therefore
fully autonomous alternate legal aid clinics, at least vis A vis the
Plan.
Clinic independence from the Plan contributed to the
intensity of the debate about legal aid services in Ontario in the
early 1970's. As experience with the Plan increased, there were
demands for new services, extended office hours and
decentralized office locations (particularly in Metro
Toronto).22 There were also demands for public participation
and more appropriate delivery models. Eventually, a Task
Force was established in January 1974 to examine and evaluate
legal aid in Ontario.2 3 The Task Force's Report (the Osler
Report) later that year recommended a mixture of delivery
systems (complementary models) for legal aid services,
including in appropriate circumstances the staffed
neighbourhood legal aid clinic. 24 The Task Force also
recommended the creation of an independent non-profit
corporation, Legal Aid Ontario. 25
The conclusions of the Osler Task Force were regarded as
official recognition of the validity of the early clinics'26
objections to the Plan. In a brief to the Ontario Government,
the early clinics supported the Report's recommendations and
urged the creation of a new legal aid corporation in which
neither the Law Society nor government representatives should
have any special status. However, the brief is also important
for identifying the fiscal dilemma then faced by the early
clinics:
There are a number of community based groups that have been
providing legal services on an experimental basis to people not
normally reached by the private bar. The existence of these
groups was a major impetus for setting up the Task Force, they
served as the models for many of the Task Force
recommendations, and the Report recommends that they be
given support by Legal Aid. These groups are in urgent need of
funds. Without further moneys almost all of them will fold by
the end of the year [1976]. We urge the government and other
funding sources to respond quickly, before it is too late. These
groups form a solid foundation on which to build and develop
community legal services. They must not be allowed to die.27
The Plan responded to some of these demands, following the
recommendation of the Community Legal Service Report (Law Society of
1972).
23 Upper Canada:
Report of the Task Force on Legal Aid, Mr. Justice Osler, Chairman
of the Attorney-General: 1974).
24 (Ministry
Id., 25.
25
1Id., 22-25.
26
Action on Legal Aid, Delivery of Legal Services: A Brief to the Ontario
Government in Response to the Report of the Osler Task Force on Legal
Aid PresentedFebruary1976 (June 1977).
27 Id., 10 (Recommendation 2).

22
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The response was a decision that the Ontario Legal Aid Plan
would fund community legal services projects 28 and the
proclamation of a new Regulation under the Legal Aid Act in
January 1976, the clinical funding Regulation. 29 This decision
marked the end of one era and the beginning of another for
community clinics. The Regulation authorized the Plan to
provide funding to "independent community-based clinical
delivery systems", 3 0 but only "clinical delivery system" was
defined in the Regulation. 3 ' The reference to "independent"
clinics was, moreover, puzzling; it is difficult to understand
how the clinics were to remain "independent" of the Plan once
the Plan assumed funding responsibilities - and the ambiguity
of this reference has produced both immediate and lasting
tensions within the clinic system.
The immediate concerns for clinic autonomy were evidenced
in ongoing difficulties about the Plan's funding arrangements
for them, and by different perceptions of such matters as the
confidentiality of client files." In June 1978, the AttorneyGeneral appointed Mr. Justice Grange 3 to review the operation
of the clinical funding Regulation and
to have regard . . . to the need for independence of clinical
delivery systems, funded under the Regulation, the need for
accountability for the expenditure of public funds, the need to
maintain good standards of service to the public, the need to
deliver service at a reasonable cost to the taxpayer, and the need
for orderly growth and development of the clinical portion of
the Ontario Legal Aid Plan."'
The Report of the Commission on Clinical Funding (the
Grange Report) concluded that clinics funded by the Plan
should have autonomy with respect to both policy and
administration, "subject only to accountability for the public
funds advanced and for the legal competence of the services
rendered." 3 5 In the words of the Report, the Plan may interfere
Noticeably, the decision to fund clinics was not accompanied by any
recommendation to establish an independent legal services corporation in
29 Ontario.
0.Reg. 160/76.
Id., s. 147.
'Id., s. 148: " 'Clinical delivery system' means any method for the delivery
of legal or para-legal services to the public other than by way of fee for
service, and includes preventive law programmes and educational and
training programmes calculated to reduce the cost of delivering legal
services."
32 A wide range of concerns was discussed at a meeting between members of
33 the Clinical Funding Committee and clinic representatives in January 1978.
Report of the Commission on Clinical Funding, Mr. Justice Grange,
Commissioner (October, 1978).
3"Letter of appointment to Mr. Justice Grange from the Honourable R. Roy
McMurtry, Attorney-General (June 27, 1978), para. 4.
35 GrangeReport, supra note 33, 22.
28
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with the operation of clinics "only if [the Plan] can bring the
interference within one or other of the public's legitimate
spheres of interest." 3
In accordance with the GrangeReport's recommendations, a
new clinic funding Regulation was proclaimed in June 1979, 31
repealing and replacing the earlier one. The new Regulation
again provided authority for the Plan to fund "independent"
community organizations;3 8 once again, "independent" was
not defined. The new Regulation also established a new
structure for funding (and defunding) clinics, 39 along with a
new five-person Committee reporting directly to Convocation
of the Law Society of Upper Canada and responsible for the
administration of Ontario clinics. 0
In the years since 1979, the clinic system in Ontario has
continued to grow and prosper. With the funding of a new
clinic in Sioux Lookout in February 1983, the total number of
clinics had reached 41, and the 1982-83 annual budget had
grown to almost seven million dollars.4 1 More significantly,
however, the uniqueness of their pattern of development has
more clearly emerged; the combination of the focus of clinic
work, the structures for decision making in the clinic system
and the nature of community involvement in clinic legal
services makes Ontario clinics uniquely capable of effective
progress toward equal justice for the poor. To a great extent,
the history of Ontario clinics as alternative legal aid services
and the less receptive environment in Ontario (at least
compared to some other Canadian provinces) has resulted in a
community clinic system which has more inherent capacity to
carry out its mandate than any others. Ironically, the apparent
intransigence of the Law Society and the difficulties between
clinics and the Plan seem to have produced a system of
community clinics which is more effective than anywhere else.
What follows is an analysis of why this is so, focusing on the
three principles which have been identified: scope of clinic
services, structures for decision making in the clinic system and
community involvement in clinic legal servies.
III. Ontario Clinics: Their Unique Characteristics
A. Scope of Clinic Services
The scope of services provided by Ontario clinics is the
product of the history of legal aid in Ontario. The Ontario
36

1d.

37

See new R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 578.
s. 148 (l)(a) and (2).
SeeReg., ss. 151 and 152 (funding) and s. 155 (defunding).
41 SeeReg., ss. 149 and 150.
4' For 1981-82, clinic expenditures were $5,469,935 out of a total of OLAP
expenditures of $56,241,045. Ontario Legal Aid Plan, Annual Report
1982, 32.
39 Id.,
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Legal Aid Plan adopted the judicare delivery system, using
private practice lawyers to provide legal aid services modelled
on the services usually provided to fee-paying clients. Use of
this model naturally resulted in the extension of legal aid
services to those problems for which a fee-paying client would
retain a lawyer: proceedings before the Supreme Court, or a
county or district court or where a client was charged with an
indictable offence.- 2 In other proceedings, the legal aid client
could have representation only subject to the discretion of the
area director of the Plan: proceedings in provincial court
(family division), small claims court, boards and tribunals;
where the client was charged with an offence which would be
tried in a summary conviction proceeding (including a violation
of a municipal bylaw); or in drawing documents, negotiating
settlements, or giving advice "wherever the subject matter or
nature thereof is properly or customarily within the scope of
the professional duties of a barrister and solicitor." 3
Perhaps because the latter activities were regarded as less
important to fee-paying clients, the legislation denied these
services "as of right" to legal aid clients in Ontario and made
them subject to the area directors' discretion. Regardless of the
reason for the legislative choice, it affected the scope of services
initially provided by the alternative legal aid clinics; essentially
clinics focussed on the "gaps" in the Plan's legal aid services,
and provided "poverty law" services. In doing so, clinics
transformed the concept of legal aid in Ontario; by focusing on
the legal needs of the poor rather than on the existing needs of
fee-paying clinics, clinics extended the full range of services
needed by thepoorin the justice system. From the early clinics'
perspective, if it was important to a welfare mother to pursue a
claim before the Social Assistance Review Board, then legal aid
representation should be available even if such services were
not generally required by fee-paying clients. Furthermore, if a
group of mothers on welfare wanted to submit a brief on
retraining allowances to the Minister, legal aid representation
should be available, just as fee-paying clients would obtain
legal assistance in making briefs to government on matters of
concern to them.
By 1978, the Grange Commission fully endorsed such clinic
activities on behalf of the poor4 4 and the need for such activities
has also been widely accepted in other jurisdictions, both in

LegalAidAct, R.S.O. 1980, c. 234, s. 12.
1d., s. 13.
"See GrangeReport, supra note 33, 1-3 for a list of the "gaps" in the Plan's
services to which community clinics responded; in the words of the Report:
"It was to plug these gaps that the clinical movement was born".

42

43
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Canada and elsewhere." Yet the Ontario experience has special
significance because it appears to be the only jurisdiction in
which there are two completely separate specialized systems in
place for delivering legal aid services. That is, while the judicare
system operates to provide representation in court proceedings
pursuant to the Legal Aid Act, the clinics provide legal advice
and representation in matters for which certificates may not be
granted. Even more significantly, community clinics have
gradually directed attention to those legal problems for which
certificates are almost never, or only infrequently, granted:
welfare, rent review, workers' compensation, unemployment
insurance, some immigration and debtor problems, tenancy
agreements, etc. On this basis, the clinics have become
"specialists in poverty law" problems while the judicare
program has continued to extend legal aid services to the poor
on the same terms as it is available to fee-paying clients. 6 The
clinics are staffed by lawyers and community legal workers
whose interest, skills and training reflecting the clinics' service
priorities; the private bar, with interests, skills and training in
traditional legal advocacy, provides legal representation in
criminal, family and some civil matters to both legal aid and
fee-paying clients.
The special significance of this functional division of roles in
Ontario must be understood by contrast to clinic arrangements
in other Canadian provinces in which the clinics conduct
"intake" functions for the whole legal aid system, offer
substantial legal aid advocacy before criminal and family
courts and also make referrals to the private bar in the fee-forservice arrangement."' In such cases, both clinic objectives and
"The legislation establishing other legal aid programs in Canada has
recognized the need to respond to the specialized problems of the poor. For
two examples, see the Quebec legislation supra note 10, s. 4, defining a
right to legal aid of "an economically underprivileged person", and the
Manitoba experience referred to by Larsen, supra note 16.
46 The specialization "away from" routine representation by clinics in family
law and criminal law matters has been noticeable in recent years (Clinic
Funding Statistics: unpublished). However, university-based clinics, with a
larger personnel than other community clinics, have continued to provide
such representation. See Mossman, Report to the Legal Aid Committee
and the Clinic FundingCommittee on University Clinics (December 1981).
These arrangements exist, for example, in Nova Scotia, Quebec, Manitoba,
Saskatchewan and British Columbia. There are a few "specialized" clinics
in other provinces as well - two in Quebec, which are integrated with the
provincial plan, fifteen in British Columbia which handle public
information, referrals and tribunal matters and one in the N.W.T. None of
these programs seems to operate with the same scope as is evident in
Ontario. See Legal Aid, 1981, supra, note 10, 33-34 for information on
"specialized" clinics, and 42 and 29 for patterns of legal clinics' activities
with respect to representation and referrals to the private bar. These
patterns are generally confirmed by the Annual Reports of provincial legal
aid schemes.
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the functions of personnel are broad and complex. Moreover, it
may be difficult to balance competing needs so as to find the
necessary time and creativity to prepare a brief on behalf of
welfare mothers, for example, and at the same time prepare for
a criminal trial. By contrast, the Ontario clinics have an
inherent capacity to focus on the specialized legal problems of
the poor and to advocate purposefully on their behalf; the
Ontario clinic system is an affirmative action program directed
to achieving equal justice and capable of performing as a
driving force on behalf of the poor. And Ontario clinics feel
freer to specialize in the legal problems of the poor, knowing
that other legal problems, for which traditional advocacy
solutions are more appropriate, can be provided by the judicare
program and by personnel who are appropriately trained to do
48

SO.

The division of functions between the clinic system and the
judicare program in Ontario thus has immense potential for the
objectives of clinics. Incontrast to jurisdictions in which clinics
have become the primary model for delivering legal aid
services, the Ontario system permits a specialization of
functions for clinics and private practice lawyers which is
arguably more efficient. For clinics, however, the real
significance is that specialization permits them to really take on
the legal problems of the poor and become their effective
advocates in the justice system. Ontario clinics need not be
merely bandaids because the overall legal aid system permits,
and even directs, them to focus their energies on systemic
poverty law problems, leaving the representation of accused
persons to the private bar.
The clearest evidence of the scope of services which clinics
are intended to provide is found in the clinic funding
Regulation under the Legal Aid Act, which provides that
funding for clinics is based on the delivery of:
. . .legal and paralegal services or both, including activities
reasonably designed to encourage access to such services or to
further such services and services designed solely to promote the
legal welfare of a community."9
Quite clearly, the Regulation endorses activities by clinics
beyond traditional advocacy and authorizes clinics to engage in
action on behalf of the clients to promote the legal welfare of

48 This assertion is tempered by the problem of increasing needs and

decreasing resources of the judicare program, particularly at present: "In
Ontario, the demand for legal aid rose 21 per cent [a three-month period]",
A.M. Lawson, Director of the OLAP: "There are more and more demands
for aid from more and more people who can't afford anything else",
James B. Chadwick, Chairman, Legal Aid Committee. See OLAP, News
Update#10 (October 1982).
49Reg., s. 148(s).
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the poor. Since 1979, the clinic contract or certificate, which
authorizes funding for each clinic, has also defined the scope of
services in the same wording." Thus, both the clinic funding
Regulation and the clinic certificate authorize clinics to
undertake effective action on behalf of poor clients.
The specialized function of Ontario clinics and their clear
mandate to advocate for equal justice for the poor make them
unique as legal aid clinics. They are also somewhat unique
because the scope of services they offer was not actively
designed, but rather grew out of the desire to respond to unmet
needs of the judicare system. To say that legal aid services now
provided by clinics and the judicare program are
complementary is not, however, to suggest that they are
without tension. Particularly because of increasing needs and
decreasing resources, the judicare program in Ontario may now
be in some jeopardy. 5 ' For this reason (among others), there
have been suggestions that some of the services now provided
by the judicare program might better be transferred to clinics
and that the intake work of area legal aid offices could also be
done by clinics. While such proposals may appear superficially
attractive, they present a real threat - to the poor - of a loss
of legal aid services specializing in poverty law and advocating,
in the broadest sense of the word, on behalf of the poor
community. The danger for Ontario clinics is that by acquiring
the workload of the judicare program, they will inevitably fall
prey to the problems of multi-purpose clinics for which there is
ample evidence in other jurisdictions. This conclusion does not
mean that a clinic system might not be an appropriate means of
providing some services now delivered by the judicare program
in Ontario, but it does mean that there are serious, even tragic,
disadvantages to utilizing the existing community clinic system
to deliver judicare services. To do so would mean that the poor
would lose their advocates for systemic change in Ontario's
justice system.
B. Structures for Decision Making in the Clinic System
Decision making about Ontario clinics, like the scope of their
services, reflects the history of their development and the
critical importance of clinic independence, which is so
characteristic of their early beginnings. The concept of
independence from the Plan is one which endorses full clinic
certificate 1982-83, clause I; this clause is not included in the
certificates of three university-based clinics which have no community
board.
5'Concerns have been expressed by the Director of OLAP and the
chairperson of the Legal Aid Committee, supra, note 48. In addition,
Ontario lawyers who participate in judicare services scheduled protest
"study days" in early 1983. The Ontario judicare situation is not unlike
that in other provinces, see supra, note 2.
SOClinic

Vol. 3

Community Legal Clinics in Ontario

independence, subject only to interference by the Plan in the
public interest with respect to accountability for public funds
and competence of services. While either of these grounds for
interference could limit clinic independence significantly, it is
of importance to note that the Grange Report clearly placed the
burden of demonstrating grounds for such interference on the
Plan."
Notwithstanding the traditional idea of clinic independence
from the Plan, the concept of clinic independence is of utmost
significance in connection with the quality of legal aid services
they provide. Independence in legal decision making is
fundamental to a democratic society, as reflected in the need
for a independent judiciary; equally important is the need for
independence in legal advocacy and representation. 3 Indeed,
the crisis in legal services inthe twentieth century results from
the need to preserve such independence in legal representation
in the face of massive government funding for legal services: to
what extent is the public's democratic right to political
accountability for government expenditures to be tempered by
the legal aid client's right to traditional independent
representation; and if there is to be some democratic
accountability for legal aid expenditures, will not this mean
that justice for legal aid clients will inevitably be second class?
The need for independence for legal aid services is not an
academic issue. To the extent that clinics are successful
advocates on behalf of the poor, they may become targets for
defunding by government, acting in accordance with the
democratic will of the majority. Even if legal services are less
successful (and therefore perhaps less visible targets for budget
cuts), they may be defunded pursuant to general government
priorities on the basis that the priorities of the majority must
prevail. In this way, protection for minority rights seems
always to be eroded when government funding is provided
because of the democratic need to take account of majority
will. The evidence of this dilemma has been all too apparent in
decisions of government, both in Canada and elsewhere, to cut
back funding for legal aid services in recent years."
To some extent, the dilemma created by public funding for
legal services - the tension between democratic decision
making by government on the one hand and legal protection for
minorities on the other - has remained essentially unresolved.
The special contribution of Ontario clinics is their development
of a process for making funding decisions for legal aid services
which separates, as much as possible, the need for
accountability for public funds from the need for independent
legal representation. An assessment of this process requires a
52 Grange Report, supra note 33, 21-22.

"This concept is more fully explored in Ellis, supra, note 4, 5-9.
14 For a good example, see Larsen, supra, note
16.
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review of the definition of clinic services, the composition of
the funding body and the process for funding and defunding of
clinics in Ontario.
In the first place, the definition of services is contained in
both the Regulation under the Legal Aid Act" and in the
contract with each clinic. Subject to this definition, a clinic has
authority to provide legal aid services within the limits of the
law and the rules of professional conduct. This authority
includes challenges to government administration, the Law
Society and the Ontario Legal Aid Plan. Interestingly, nothing
in the definition of clinic legal services precludes clinics from
undertaking work for which the judicare program provides a
certificate, although clinics must provide services "on a basis
other than fee-for-service." 5 ' The complementary nature of the
services provided by clinics and judicare thus results from
historical and functional demands rather than from
administrative fiat, and it is now well recognized that a clinic
client who chooses to appeal a case may continue to retain a
clinic employee even when a certificate would issue.57
Notwithstanding the importance of the broad scope of clinic
services, however, it is clear that clinic independence depends
much more critically on the process for making funding
decisions, since a negative funding decision for a clinic would
completely shatter any potential for independent legal
representation; more subtly, perhaps funding decisions may
also influence the type or extent of legal representation that is
actually provided by clinics. For both these reasons, the
funding process is a critical element in determining whether
independent legal representation is possible.
The key element in the process for decision making about
Ontario clinics and the one 'which most affects the quality of
their independent services, is the composition of the funding
body. The funding body must be as independent as possible
from any controlling influence. Ontario clinics are funded by
the Clinic Funding Committee, an appointed body of five
persons established by the Regulation.5" The Law Society,
which has administrative responsibility for the Plan, appoints
three persons to the CFC,5 9 and the provincial AttorneyGeneral

appoints

the other two. 60

However, one

of the

members appointed both by the Law Society and by the
Attorney-General must, pursuant to the Regulation, be a
person "associated
55

with a clinic." ' 6 ' The CFC is entirely

Reg., s. 148(2).

Id.
7The principle was recognized formally in the CFC's decision to authorize
payment of disbursements in the Reference re: Constitutionality of the

56

Residential Tenancies Act [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714 (S.C.C.).

58
Reg., s.
9

149.

' Reg., s. 149(3).
6 0
62

id.

Reg., s. 149(4).
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separate from the Legal Aid Committee; while the latter
Committee has general responsibility for the Plan as a
Committee of the Law Society, the CFC has responsibility
under the Regulation for the overall administration of clinic
funding.6" Because the Law Society has overall responsibility
for the Plan, the CFC reports directly to Convocation of the
Law Society. 3 However, there can be no appeal from any
funding decision65 of the CFC 64 (other than perhaps by way of
judicial review).
The composition of the Committee ensures that its decision
making about community clinics takes account of relevant
interests, but that there is no single controlling influence. The
funder (the Attorney-General), the administrator (the Law
Society) and the clinics are all represented among the
appointees. The independence of the Committee is also
protected. It is protected from the Attorney-General because he
may appoint only two of the five members, and one of the two
must be a person with previous "clinic association." It is
protected from the Law Society because, although it may
appoint three members, one must also be a person with
previous clinic association. It is protected from the Plan and
the Legal Aid Committee because the CFC reports directly to
Convocation (and not through the Legal Aid Committee). And
it is protected from Convocation because there is no appeal
from a funding decision of the CFC. The CFC's independence
in decision making is also enhanced because it acts as an
appellate tribunal for clinics on funding decisions made by the
Committee's staff,66 and is thus also independent of the initial
funding decision making. The Committee's objectivity, in
addition to its composition, ensures further protection in
decision making about clinic funding. Thus, while individual
members of the Committee may advance their own interests
very strongly, the Committee's decision must in all cases
represent at least a partial consensus from among the CFC's
members, whose interests are often competing ones. This need
for an alliance provides a measure of protection for the
independence of clinic legal services which, while it is less than
complete, is certainly more substantial than would be possible
if funding decisions could be made by the Attorney-General,
acting alone for example.
The CFC's composition does not, however, provide the only
protection for independent legal services in community clinics.
A further element of this protection is found in the annual
process of obtaining funds for clinics. The CFC is responsible
62 Reg., s. 149(7) and s. 150(l)(a).
63
64

Reg., s. 153(2).
Reg., s. 152(5).

There is no authority on this point, but the CFC has chosen to operate since
1979 as if its proceedings were subject to judicial review.
66Reg., s. 152.
65
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for determining the needs of community clinics and defining an
annual budget request; 6' the CFC's request is included in the
overall request made by the Law Society on behalf of the
Plan."' Once the amount of the overall budget for the Plan has
been determined, however, the Attorney-General is required by
the Regulation to designate the amount to be allocated for
community clinics. 9 In the result, the clinic budget forms part
of the Law Society's annual request for funds for legal aid
services, for which the Society has both a statutory 0 and a
professional responsibility. Because the Attorney-General
designates the amount for clinics out of the overall amount
allocated to legal aid, the CFC has the benefit of substantiating
its request on two separate occasions. It is at least arguable that
this process contributes further to the independence of clinic
legal services because two different decisions are required.
More significantly, however, independence is achieved because
neither the Law Society's request nor the Minister's designation
can affect the allocation for any individual clinic; such a
decision is made by the Committee's staff,' subject to the
provisions for appealing to the CFC.72 Thus, for example, a
clinic which successfully filed a private prosecution against a
Cabinet Minister on behalf of a client, or a clinic which
successfully challenged the denial of a legal aid certificate to a
client, cannot be adversely affected either by the Law Society's
request or by the Attorney-General's designation. And, in the
absence of an appropriate alliance between CFC members, and
excluding clinic appointees, it could not be adversely affected
by an appeal to the CFC. In the absence of an appeal, the
clinic's budget needs must be determined by the Committee's
staff in accordance with the Grange Report's direction that
clinics should be independent, subject only to interference from
the Plan in the public interest to protect accountability for
public funds and competence of services. 7 3 So long as clinic
activities meet the definition of activities provided in the
Regulation, their independence, subject to the Grange Report's
limits, can be reasonably assured by the funding process.
Similarly, there is some protection for independent clinic
services in the defunding process. Because initial decisions are
67

Reg., s. 158. The Grange Report, supra note 33, recommended that: "....

the role of the Committee should not be a political one. Its task ... is to
estimate the need and then if the funds are inadequate for that need, to
establish priorities among the applicants. It may be that political
considerations will affect the allotment. I cannot see why it should affect
the request; the amount requested should represent the amount genuinely
considered by the Committee to correspond with the need."
68LegalAidAct, s. 6.
69

70

Reg., s. 159.

LegalAidAct, s. 2.
Reg., s. 151.
72
Reg., s. 152.
" Grange Report, supranote 33.
7'
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made by the Committee's staff, the CFC is able to act as an
impartial appellate tribunal; in some cases, a clinic has a right
of appeal, while in other, the clinic must seek leave to appeal to
the CFC. 4 And while the CFC may decide to defund a clinic
other than during the funding process, it may do so only when
the CFC makes a finding that the clinic "has failed to abide by
or has contravened '

75

a condition of its certificate. Moreover,

the Regulation requires that
the Committee shall not make a finding ...

unless it has given

notice of the proposal to the clinic, together with written
to the clinic an opportunity to be
reasons, and has provided
heard by the Committee.7 6
These defunding procedures, coupled with the Committee's
composition and the possibility that the CFC's decisions may
be subject to scrutiny by way of judicial review add to the
measure of protection for independent legal services provided
by clinics.
The structure for decision making in the Ontario clinic
system cannot, by itself, fully guarantee independent legal
services in clinics. The structure described, however, provides a
greater chance for achieving independence than a system in
which one person makes funding decisions; the consequences of
adverse decisions or compromised services is all too evident in
other jurisdictions when a change in the incumbent of the
Attorney-General's portfolio has occurred. What is asserted
here, and all that is asserted, is that a broadly-based and
balanced process for decision making may provide greater long
term protection for a clinic system than one champion. Clearly,
to have a strong and independent clinic system which is
championed by the Attorney-General is advantageous, but to
rely on a champion alone is to put legal aid services in great
jeopardy.
It must, of course, be noted that the Ontario system is
complicated, much more complicated than a structure
involving only one decision maker. The issue, however, is
whether its complexity is too great in light of its objective: the
independence of publicly-funded clinic legal aid services. In the
interests of equal justice, a structure which substantially
achieves independent legal representation for the poor,
notwithstanding the need to account for public funds and
provide competent services, should not be rejected on account
of complexity, at least in the absence of any compelling
alternative.
C. Community Involvement in Clinic Legal Services
The significance of community involvement in Ontario
clinics is difficult to measure. The difficulty stems from the
74

SeeReg. s. 152 and s. 148(l)(f).
Reg., s. 155(1).
76
Reg., s. 155(3).
75
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elusiveness of the concept of community and the different
meanings assigned to it in different contexts. For example,
while Ontario clinics were established outside the framework of
the Ontario Legal Aid Plan and the Law Society, and therefore
outside the governing body of the legal profession, there were
several individual lawyers who actively participated in creating
the early clinics. On this basis, the community cannot be
defined as necessarily excluding lawyers. What is clear in
retrospect, however, is that the absence of a concrete idea of
community did not impede the activities of people (including
some lawyers) whose commitment to providing a needed service
resulted in the creation of the early clinics.
The idea of community involvement in legal aid services was
generated by both the developments in the United States, where
the Economic OpportunityAct of 1964 included a requirement
of maximum feasible participation by affected residents," and
by prevailing political philosophy of the early 1970's in
Canada, where funding for community action projects,
including LIP and OFY (Opportunities for Youth) was created.
There was a dominant sense of optimism that the community
could and should be involved in its own development with
respect to legal services as well as other services. This
philosophy was also consistent with the view (repeatedly
expressed by proponents of early clinics) that the
transformation of legal services from charity provided by the
legal profession to a right funded by the public purse required
representation of a broader range of interests in decision
making about such services. Arguably, clients who received
services, government which allocated funds, and the tax paying
public deserved to be involved, in addition to lawyers, in
decisions about publicly-funded legal aid services. In Ontario,
the intransigence of the Law Society on the issue of such shared
control, even after the Osler Task Force Report, once again
emphasized the significant differences between the clinics and
the Society's judicare program.
Even within the clinic system, however, the concept of
community was ill-defined. In some cases, the community
meant the people actively involved in the clinic; in other cases,
it meant the target group for whom the clinic services were
designed, even though no structure existed by which the target
group could influence clinic priorities. In a few cases, where
early clinics developed geographical boundaries and limited
services to residents within the boundaries, it was possible to
organize a meeting and elect a community board." This
arrangement was not widespread, and clinics which had boards
7 For a provoking discussion of the background to this provision, see Larsen,
supra, note 16; the United States experience was also influenced by E. & J.
Cahn, "The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective" (1964), 73 Yale L.J.
1317.
78

An early example was Parkdale Community Legal Services.
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sometimes included among the board's members only
appointed persons and staff members employed at the clinic. In
general, the community involvement in the early clinics was
uneven, reflecting much of the strength of grassroots
development as well as its lack of overall structure.
By 1976, when funding for clinics by the Plan commenced,
the concept of community was identified at least clearly enough
to be included in the definition of funding in the Regulation; it
referred to "independent community-based clinical delivery
systems". 9 Given the variation in the nature and extent of
community involvement in clinics at that time, it is hardly
surprising that the definition could do no more than refer to a
clinic's community base. However, the definition at least
identified the focus of the clinic, clearly differentiating it from
the Law Society or the Plan. By 1979, the definition in the
Regulation was altered, and a clinic was defined as an
independent community organization." From a community
base, clinics had developed into community organizations.
Moreover, on the basis of the Grange Report's recommendation, community was defined to include a geographical
community, persons who have a community of interest, and the
general public. 8 ,
The change in the wording of the 1979 Regulation produced
little immediate effect on the existing clinics. From 1979,
however, the newly-appointed CFC and its staff consistently
used the terms of the clinic certificate to influence clinic
structures and to strengthen the role of community-elected
boards. Early on, the certificate included a clause requiring a
clinic to have a Board of Directors "including some persons
representative of the community served by the clinic", and later
certificates required the adoption of constitutions for clinics
and the establishment of procedures for matters such as
complaints about clinic services. 8" All of these measures were
justified in accordance with the Grange Report's proviso that
the Plan could interfere in the public interest to ensure either
accountability for public funds or competence of services.
From the Plan's perspective, it was not possible to demonstrate
accountability for increasingly large amount of public funds
for clinics in the absence of some structure for decision making
which met minimum standards of accountability.
In the clinic context, few actions by the Plan have produced
such grave misunderstanding as the efforts to implement
minimum standards of accountable decision making. On the
part of clinics, every new requirement was seen as an
interference with autonomy and an attempt by Plan
administrators to impose their ideas on an unwilling
79 0. Reg.
80

160/76, s. 147.
Reg., s. 148(1)(a).
81 Reg., s. 148(1)(d).
82 Clinic certificates 1981-82 and 1982-83.
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community. From the Plan's perspective, the possibility of
sustained growth in the number of clinics, and continued
capacity for effective legal challenges, both depended on the
demonstration of public accountability, in the financial
arrangements of clinics and in their decision making. There can
be no doubt to anyone who has ever experienced it that the
strength of commitment of community clinic boards has often
substantially increased because they have felt (rightly or not)
threatened by a loss of control to a "Toronto bureaucrat". 8 3
The most significant aspect of the GrangeReport's limits on
clinic independence, however, is that they leave community
boards with full responsibility for the selection of legal services.
With respect to the choice of areas of legal problems and the
deployment of staff resources to respond to such needs, the
clinic board is fully in charge, subject only to the board
definition of legal services in the Regulation. In practice, this
means that a clinic board may determine that it will make
unemployment a priority problem because unemployment is a
chronic problem in the community. This might mean, for
example, a direction to staff to challenge every unemployment
entitlement decision for a defined period, to write and submit a
brief to the legislature based on the problems experienced by
clinic clients who are unemployed and to hold meetings with
unemployed persons interested in self help and mutual support.
Notwithstanding the Grange Report's limits on clinic
independence, the capacity of a clinic board to identify a
community problem and marshall its resources "to promote
the legal welfare" of the poor community is limited only by its
imagination.
The potential for a clinic board to utilize effectively the
resources entrusted to it underlines the need for accountability
in the process by which its decisions are made. If a board does
identify a problem, prioritize its needs, marshall its resources
and take on all opponents on behalf of the poor, it will, in any
such process, need to ensure that its decision is "legitimate" both because the clinic may deny services to other potential
clients in order to undertake a major effort on behalf of the
unemployed and because the clinic will undoubtedly be
challenged by those who its efforts adversely affect, such as
government. A decision made by a community board, elected in
accordance with procedures in a written constitution and with a
mandate under a Regulation to "promote the welfare" of the
poor, cannot be effectively challenged; by contrast, a group
which is self appointed and without minimum procedures for
fair decision making has much less credibility when it responds
to a client who has been denied service or to an outraged
bureaucrat. Thus, the efficacy of community control of
83 A recurring theme in appeals by clinics to the CFC, at least with respect to

terms and conditions of the clinic certificate, has been the interference by
the Committee's staff in the autonomy of clinics.
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effective legal services depends on the legitimacy of its process
for making decisions, but the substantive choice about the
allocation of its resources remains, subject to the Regulation,
completely within the control of a community board.
The need to legitimate controversial decisions by community
boards about the use of scarce resources in providing legal aid
services motivated the Plan to request appropriate decision
making structures. Because each clinic board is the product of
its own community, reflecting its own concerns and goals, the
Plan's requirements were proposed as minimum standards
only; there is no requirement of uniformity.
Indeed, the absence of uniformity is the strength of the
community clinics in Ontario. If each clinic board can reflect
the special concerns and priorities of its poor community, it
will, of necessity, become the advocate for those people.
Through natural links with other people and groups in its own
community, and across Ontario, such a clinic board has a
significant capacity to influence policies affecting its own
clients as well as others with similar problems throughout the
province. A clinic's activities can identify legal reform which is
needed and can greatly assist in the process of achieving it. In
the long term, this means that clinics become valuable, even
indispensable, tools for achieving equal justice for the poor. As
such, community support for and involvement in clinics will
make it difficult or even impossible for their funding to be
drastically reduced.
Even if the protections in the Regulation and the certificate
for the services provided were removed, and even if some of the
protections of the funding process were eroded, the Ontario
clinics could nonetheless retain some capacity for independent
legal representation by means of their political strength,
dependent entirely on the support of the community. In this
light, community involvement - especially involvement which
is both meaningful and accountable - is more than an
interesting ideal; it is the most vital element in the unique
characteristics of Ontario clinics.
IV Ontario Clinics in the 1980s - An Assessment 8 '
The preceding analysis of the history of clinics in Ontario,
and of the characteristics which make them uniquely capable of
surviving in the face of economic recession, is intended as an
assessment of the inherent strength of the clinic system in
Otario. In my view, there are significant differences between
the Ontario clinic system and clinics which have developed in
other jurisdictions. Although this analysis has shown the
inherent strength of Ontario clinics and their unique capacity
for survival, it would be wrong to conclude that they are
84
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invulnerable. Indeed, by demonstrating the careful balance
which has been achieved in the Ontario clinic system, this
analysis also points to the delicacy of the balance which must be
maintained. In my opinion, community clinics in Ontario have
the capacity to meet the legal services crises of the 1980's, just
as they have done in the preceding decades, but the emerging
issues require an appreciation of community clinics and their
potential on the part of government, the legal profession and
clinics.
A. Renewing the Service Mandate: Clinics and the
Legal Profession
In this analysis, I have tried to show that the history of
Ontario clinics has resulted in a Regulation which defines a
broad scope of services; indeed, I have suggested that the
Regulation provides a mandate for Ontario clinics to take on
the systemic legal problems of the poor rather than to be
limited to merely ad hoc remedies. A service mandate direct to
promoting "the legal welfare of a community" presents both
an opportunity and a challenge to eliminate inequality in the
justice system.
In relation to the service mandate, there are important
choices presently facing Ontario clinics. In the first place,
individual clinics must define more systematically the scope of
services they want to provide. Too frequently, clinics in
Ontario have simply responded to the service needs which have
"walked in the front door"; such a passive response approach
inevitably means that other legal needs, perhaps more
compelling because less often recognized, are not met at all.
Moreover, the case-by-case approach, by itself, may frequently
do little or nothing to promote the legal welfare of the poor.
Thus, while there is a basic clinic responsibility to get involved
in the day-to-day legal problems faced by the poor, clinic
boards must also systematically assess the nature of the services
they provide in terms of the real problems of their low-income
community. In addition, both clinic boards and staff must
continually reassess the strategies they use to most effectively
promote the legal welfare of the community. Moreover, in the
context of a clinic system with inherent capacity to achieve so
much effective equality for the poor, and taking account of the
scarce resources available, clinics as a group may need to begin
defining the limits of community control when a board is
unwilling to define a service mandate for its community which
goes beyond the band aid ad hoc approach.
The second issue facing clinics is the need to define the limits
of the service mandate set out in the Regulation, particularly
when clinics are actively providing legal services in addition to
case-by-case services for clients. In his letter of December 16,
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1982,85 the newly-appointed chairperson of the Clinic Funding
Committee endorsed the enthusiasm of the GrangeReport for a
full range of clinic legal services on behalf of the poor. He also
expressed the CFC's concern about the consequences of
"political activities by clinics". The issues raised by the
Chairman's letter are critical for the future of Ontario clinics
because they may affect their ability to "promote the legal
welfare" of the low-income community. It is essential, first of
all, to understand that the service mandate of clinics
(promoting the legal welfare of the community) both permits,
and indeed requires, clinics to advocate on behalf of the poor in
a partisan, and not a neutral, manner. To the extent, therefore,
that the chairperson has suggested that clinics "must always be
non-partisan", his statement is not consistent with the service
mandate of the Regulation. On the other hand, to the extent
that his letter suggests a lack of authority in the Regulation for
"the possible promotion of any political party when clinic
employees are speaking to tenants about rent review", the
Chairman's analysis may be more accurate. There is a
difference between partisan advocacy on behalf of the poor and
partisan political activities; the former is clearly part of the
service mandate of Ontario clinics while the latter probably are
not. The crucial point is that clinics must themselves define the
limit, perhaps in consultation with the CFC, in order to ensure
that the limits of the service mandate are not exceeded, but,
more importantly, that they are fulfilled. In the context of any
such discussion, it will also be of critical importance to
understand the boundary between clinic advocacy on behalf of
the poor (pursuant to the Regulation) and the strategies which
may be necessary to obtain ongoing funding for clinics. To the
extent that the chairperson's letter may appear to suggest that
ongoing funding for clinics depends on some restraint in their
wholehearted promotion of the legal welfare of the poor
community, his assertions cannot be accepted.
Finally, the service mandate of clinics requires an
appreciation of their role in the context of the Plan's judicare
program. To the extent that the judicare program presently
faces some jeopardy86 (for a variety of reasons), the service
mandate of clinics may also be affected; notwithstanding their
separate structures for delivering legal aid services, clinics and
the judicare program are mutually dependent. And although it
may be appropriate to consider the efficacy of delivering
judicare services by salaried staff, it is critical to understand
that the service mandate of community clinics cannot be
adapted to the provision of simultaneous judicare services
without losing the essence of their present service mandate. The
8 Letter from Roger D. Yachetti, Q.C., chairperson of the Clinic Funding

Committee to the Chairpersons of Boards of Directors and Deans of Law
Faculties, December 16, 1982.
86 News Update, supra, note 48.
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issue is not the appropriate delivery system but the scope of
services to be offered. In this respect, both clinics and judicare
lawyers have a mutual interest in an acceptable resolution of
the judicare dilemma. In addition, both clinics, and other
members of the legal profession have a mutual interest in
ensuring the equal justice for the poor which community clinics
have a mandate to achieve.
B. Maintaining Independent Legal Service: Clinics and
the Government
In this analysis, I have also tried to demonstrate the critical
importance of independent legal services provided by clinics
and the delicate nature of the structure developed to achieve
this objective. I have also noted the additional advantages
accruing to clinics through the Minister's personal support for
their activities. Ironically, it is the Minister's unqualified
support for clinics which has, in recent months, resulted in a
weakening of the structures designed to protect clinic
independence. Notwithstanding his good intentions, the
Minister's actions require careful scrutiny in the interest of the
continued capacity for independent clinics to promote the legal
welfare of the poor.
As has been demonstrated, the independence of clinics
depends substantially on the existence of a CFC which is free
from any controlling influence in its decision making. The
Minister's decision in early 198287 to appoint two of his senior
officials to vacant positions on the CFC signified both his
personal support for clinics and his concern to ensure that clinic
interests received due attention in his Ministry. Unfortunately,
his choice also undermined the delicate balance earlier achieved
by the CFC, thereby creating a possibility of more overt
governmental intervention in the activities of clinics and their
advocacy on behalf of the poor. That the Minister's appointees
were persons with some experience in legal aid matters and a
sincere commitment to clinics is beside the point; their positions
placed them, inevitably, in a conflict of interest on any issue
where independent legal representation of the poor was
inconsistent with governmental (and Ministerial) policies.
Moreover, since this potential conflict of interest problem
could be identified in advance, it seems that the Minister's
87

The Minister had been requested to make an appointment to replace Brian
Bellmore, who had earlier resigned; in February 1982, he announced the
appointment of J. Douglas Ewart, Director, Policy Development

Department, to replace Mr. Bellmore. At the same time, the Minister
announced the appointment of Glenn Carter, General Manager (Programs
and Administration Division) to replace an existing member of the CFC,
Michael Fitzpatrick (Director of Courts Administration). The Minister
confirmed that Mr. Ewart, who had worked as a student at Parkdale
Community Legal Services in 1971, was a person with "previous clinic
association".
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choice must have been made only because he was unable to find
any equally suitable appointees who were not employees of his
Ministry; particularly with respect to the appointee "with
previous clinic association", it is unfortunate that the
Minister's choice creates an inevitable conflict between the need
to protect independence of clinic legal services and the
obligation to defend Ministry policy about legal aid services.
And it is essential to recognize that these concerns are live
issues, particularly taking into account the need to resolve
existing problems with the judicare services. The possibility
that community clinics might be expected to undertake the
delivery of judicare services clearly demonstrates the conflict
between the clinics' interest in continued specialization in
poverty law problems to promote the legal welfare of the poor
and the Ministry's interest in cost-effective delivery of high
volume legal aid services. Because two members of the CFC
could not vote independently on any such proposal, there must
be serious concern about the integrity of CFC decision making,
and its continued role in preserving independent legal services
for the poor. In this context, the Minister's personal support
for clinics and his expressed desire to increase their resources
requires very careful assessment.
C. Achieving Equal Justice: Clinics and their Communities
The requirement in the 1979 Regulation for a clinic to be a
community organization reflects the significance of the concept
of community in Ontario clinics. As I have suggested, the
recognition of the community's importance to successful clinic
action on behalf of the poor has steadily increased, particularly
since 1979. Moreover, as has been shown, it is the community
which offers the final link in the structures for achieving
independent legal representation in the face of substantial
public funding for legal aid services.
In this context, Ontario clinics must also be confident that
their community organizations are scrupulously independent of
other community groups, particularly in relation to decision
making procedures and financial arrangements. It is critical to
the credibility of successful advocacy on behalf of the poor that
a community clinic be, and be seen to be, independent. In this
way, independence from government is complemented by
independence from other community groups. Notwithstanding
that many clinics have evolved out of other community groups,
the success of a clinic's advocacy, as well as its credibility as an
independent legal service, depend on its scrupulous
independence from other community groups. In recent months,
the recognition of MTLS's (Metropolitan Tenants Association)
need to make decisions about priorities for its legal service,88
88 See Report: Independent Community Clinics and Other Community
Organizations- a Report to the CFC on MTLS and the FMTA (August
1982); the Report was substantially accepted by MTLS and recently
approved by the CFC.
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independently of the Federation of Metro Tenants, has
signalled a recognition of the importance of this principle and
of the coming of age of community clinics in Ontario.
The concept of the community is a vital part of Ontario
clinics: the community includes the many people over many
years who have made their contribution to the growth and
success of clinics, as well as the people to whom clinics, in many
different ways, have provided assistance. As I have suggested,
the Ontario clinics have a unique opportunity to fulfill the
promise of legal aid services. The challenge for Ontario's
community clinics is the responsibility of achieving equal
justice by and for their community: the poor.

